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Preface
This book builds on a panel I organized and chaired at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law in April 2014. The panel sparked
an important conversation among participants and highlighted the importance of issues related to challenges and recusals of judges and arbitrators for
international dispute resolution. After the panel, Marie Sheldon, Publishing
Director of International Law at Brill/Nijhoff Publishers, suggested I collect the
presentations made at the panel in a book. I was intrigued by the idea and-so,
this book was born.
I asked the panelists and other experts to join the dialogue on this key issue
and I was gratified by the positive response I received. This book now combines expertise from academia as well as from all realms of practice, from law
firm practitioners, to former judicial clerks, arbitrators and members of several
secretariats. I am grateful to all contributors to this book for their excellent
work. Of course, their contributions are made on a personal note only and do
not represent the positions of any of the institutions to which they are or may
have been affiliated.
My deep gratitude also goes to Sheherezade Malik, a Juris Doctor student
from Richmond University School of Law, for her impeccable research and editorial assistance. She has done a great job.
I am also sincerely and profoundly grateful to my family, Andre, Alex and
Charlotte, without whom nothing has meaning.
C.G.

Washington D.c.
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These initial chapters provide a essential foundation for the analysis of
challenges and recusal of judges and arbitrators. As such, they assess several
specific issues, including the available procedures, reasons asserted to initiate
a challenge procedure, who decides the challenges and results of the challenge
procedures. Importantly, they also allow for a comparison among different
forums.
The following three chapters analyze challenges from a different prospective. Namely, they examine specific issues that are often reasons for parties
to begin a challenges procedure. In chapter eight, Romain Zamour considers
issue conflicts and the reasonable expectation of an open mind, specifically
in the context of the challenge decision in Devas v. India. Judith Levine, in
chapter nine, examines the important issues of late-in-the game challenges
and spurious challenges and resignations within the context of tactical challenges. In chapter ten, Luke Sobota assesses repeat arbitrator appointments in
international investment disputes, a oft-cited reason to challenge arbitrators.
In the next three chapters, the analysis shift to personal perspectives. In
chapter eleven, Charles Brower, Sarah Melikian and Michael Daly recount tall
and small tales of a challenged arbitrator from a first-hand experience. Next,
in chapter twelve, Andrew Loewenstein describes the approach and consideration of counsel to challenges in international disputes. Finally, in chapter
thirteen, Hansel Pham and Imad Khan examine challenges to party representatives and counsel before international courts and tribunals a unique mechanism at times used as an alternative to challenge the decision-maker.
The final two chapters analyze challenges from a geographical prospective
and seek to determine whether there is a regional variation to challenges. In
chapter fourteen, Lucy Reed, John Choong and Chan Yong Wei explain challenges to arbitrators in Asia, and especially the position before the Singapore
and Hong Kong Courts. Finally, in chapter fifteen, Jonathan Hamilton, Francisco
Jijon and Ernesto Corzo consider arbitrators challenges in Latin America.

CHAPTER I

The Challenge and Recusal of Judges of the
International Court of Justice
Chiara Giorgetti

1

Introduction

The rules and mechanisms to challenge and recuse a judge of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") are unique and pertain to the control mechanisms
proper to permanent international dispute resolution bodies, characterized by
a plurality of representative, elected judges.
Indeed, the Statute of the I CJ ("Statute") 1 provides a series of control mechanisms aimed at ensuring the independence and impartiality of its judges.2
The drafters of the Statute adopted a multi-tiered approach, relying first on
self-control of each judge, and then envisaging a subsidiary control role for
the President and the Court as a whole. Third-party requests for recusals are
provided for in the Statute, but are extremely rare. The Court relies mostly on a
self-regulation system, by which it is for a judge to recuse him or herself when
the case so requires. The President of the Court and the Court as a whole only
step in to provide a back-up and ensure that the framework is respected. Thus,
should reasons exist for which a judge should be removed or not sit in a case,
the President and the Court retain the power to take the final decision, sua
sponte or as requested by a party, to remove the judge.
This approach is understandable, not only because it follows the tradition
established by the predecessor of the I CJ, the Permanent Court of International
Justice ("PCIJ"), but also because the situation at the ICJ is intrinsically
* I am grateful to Saud Aldawsari from Richmond University School of Law for his excellent
research assistance for this chapter..
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice, concluded June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat.
1031, T.s. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
2 The applicable legal framework can be found in Arts. 2, 13-20, 24 of the Statute of the Court
and in Arts. 1-14 and 34 of the Rules of the Court and Practice Directions VII and VIII. See !CJ
Statute; The !CJ Rules of Procedure, adopted April 14, 1978, 17 J.L.M. 1286 (1978) [hereinafter
ICJ Rules]; Practice Direction VII, adopted Oct. 2001, !CJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/
index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0; Practice Direction VIII, adopted Oct. 2001, !CJ, http:l/www
.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0.
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different from that of arbitration: the ICJ is a permanent court, which acts as
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations in inter-states disputes, its
the bench is composed of fifteen elected judges who serve for relatively long
terms.3 Thus, differently from arbitration, judges do not know what cases they
will be called to decide and incompatibilities could arise after their election to
the bench.
Though self regulation has to a large extent be sufficient, the existing control system calls for examination, especially in light of the increased caseload
of the Court and the fact that the judges of the ICJ remain active members of
the international legal community, including as international arbitrators.
This chapter first briefly explains how the ICJ judges are elected and nominated. It then explores the issues of relative and functional incompatibilities of
judges. Next, it describes and assesses existing mechanisms of control, including resignation, self-recusal and disqualification of judges. Finally, it assesses
the three publicly known cases of recusals. The chapter concludes with a brief
assessment of the practice.

2

The Judges of the International Court of Justice

The bench of the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, comprises fifteen judges elected for a renewable term of nine years.4 Article 3(1) of
the Statute of the Court, the instrument that regulates the constitution and the
function of the ICJ, provides that no two judges may be nationals of the same
state. 5
Article 2 of the Statute specifies the requirements that each member of the
Court must fulfill in order to be elected. It provides that:
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected
regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries

3 ICJ Statute Art.3
4 !CJ Statute Arts. 3, 13. See generally Robert Kolb, The International Court of Justice 109-uB
(2013); 1 Shabtai Rosanne, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice 19202005, at 408 (2nd ed., 2006); Statute of the Court, Int'! Ct. Just.[ICJ], http://www.icj-cij.org/
documents/?p1=4&p2=2 (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) ("Statute of the International Court of
Justice is annexed to the United Nations, of which it forms an integral part.").
5 !CJ Statute Art. 3(1).
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for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law. 6
The Statute further specifies that members of the Court elected by the General
Assembly and by the Security Council of the United Nations should come from
a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of
Arbitration ("PCA") or in cases of Members of the United Nations not represented in the PCA, by national groups appointed for this purpose by their governments under the same conditions as those prescribed for PCA members.7
It is recommended that in making their nominations, national groups consult their highest court of justice, legal faculties and schools of law, and their
national academies and national sections of international academies devoted
to the study of law. Groups may not nominate more than four persons, not
more than two of whom shall be of their own nationality. 8 The number of candidates nominated by a group should not be more than double the number of
seats to be filled.9
In electing members, the General Assembly and the Security Council proceed independently of one another. Candidates are then elected when they
obtain an absolute majority of votes in both the General Assembly and in the
Security Council. 10 During the election, electors are required to bear in mind
two considerations, and namely "not only that the persons to be elected should
individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a

6

Statute Art. 2. See generally Aznar-Gomez, Article 2, in The Statute of the International
Court ofJustice, A Commentary (Andreas Zimmermann, Karin Oellers-Frahm & Christian

!CJ

Tomuschat eds., 2nd ed., 2012).
7
8
9
10

!CJ Statute Art. 4.
Id.Art. 6.
Id.Art.5.
Id. Arts. 8, 10. Article 10 provides that candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes
in both the General Assembly and the Council are elected. If no candidate receives an
absolute majority on the first ballot in either the General Assembly or the Council, a second ballot is held. Balloting continues until a candidate has obtained the required majority in both bodies. Articles 11 and 12 of the Statute provide that if the General Assembly
and the Council do not select the same candidate, they will proceed to a second meeting
and, if necessary, a third meeting, following the same procedures. If by then the position
is not filled, the Council and General Assembly may decide to convene a conference of
six members (three from each body) to recommend a candidate for acceptance by both
bodies. Id. Arts. 11-12.
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whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal
legal systems of the world should be assured:'11
The Duties ofElectedjudges
Judges at the ICJ serve in their personal capacity and not on behalf of any
government. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties in a case retain
their rights to sit in the case before the Court, unless a specific incompatibility
2 .1

exist. 12
All judges are required, upon taking up their duties, to make a solemn declaration in open court that they "will perform [their] duties and exercise [their]
powers as judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiouslY:'13 This
declaration is along the lines of the declarations that judges make in other
international courts.14
11

12
13

/
14

ICJ Statute Art. g. In practice, this requirement is satisfied with the convention of equitable geographical distribution. The practice is to have one judge each from each of the
permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK and the us) and
the remaining ten seats distributed as following: five for Western Europe and Other States,
three for Africa, three for Asia, two for Easter Europe and two for Latin America and
Caribbean countries. See Ruth MacKenzie et al., Selecting International]udges: Principle,
Process and Politics 28 (2010 ).
ICJ Statute Art. 31(1).
Article 4 of the Rules of the Court specifies the text of the declaration to be read in court.
Judges are required to state that: "I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and
exercise my powers as judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously." ICJ
Rules Art. 4. This declaration is to be made at the first public sitting at which the Member
of the Court is present.
For example, judges at the International Criminal Court (rec) take a public oath declaring:
"I solemnly undertake that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as a judge of
the International Criminal Court honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously,
and that I will respect the confidentiality of investigations and prosecutions and the
secrecy of deliberations". rec Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted Sept. g, 2002, rec
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part. rr-A); see Press Release, Int'! Criminal Court, Six Newly Elected
rec Judges to be Sworn in on 10 March 2015 (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/icc/press%2oand%2omedia/press%2oreleases/Pages/ma178.aspx. At I CS ID, arbitrators make a declaration that states, in the relevant part, that:" 'I shall keep confidential
all information coming to my knowledge as a result of my participation in this proceeding, as well as the contents of any award made by the Tribunal. 'I shall judge fairly as
between the parties, according to the applicable law, and shall not accept any instruction
or compensation with regard to the proceeding from any source except as provided in the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States and in the Regulations and Rules made pursuant thereto." rcsm Arbitration
Rules of Procedure r. 6, adopted Apr. 2006, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID /StaticFiles/
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Members of the Court need to hold themselves permanently at the disposal
of the Court, unless they are on leave or are prevented from doing so by illness
or by another serious reason duly explained to the President. 15 Judges become
international civil servants and are entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities when engaged on the business of the Court.16 Judges are remunerated as
decided by the UN General Assembly.
Additionally, as explained below, the Statute provides for certain relative
and absolute incompatibilities with the function of judge.
Relative Incompatibility to Serve as judge in the Court
Under the Statute of the Court, judges must refrain from sitting in certain
cases. Thus, Article 17(1) of the Statute provides that no member may act as
agent, counsel, or advocate in any case.17 Further, Article 17(2) also dictates
that members may not participate in the decision of any case in which they
have previously taken part "as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of
enquiry, or in any other capacity."18
Relative incompatibility relates to the impartiality and independence of a
judge in particularly cases, and is temporary. 19 Thus, a judge who acted as legal
advisor to her government in a particular case before her election to the Bench,
or was consulted and acted as an advocate when he was in academia before
joining the Court is barred from serving as judges in the case on which they
have worked. As a matter of legal policy, this is a fundamental guarantee for a
fair process. Similar incompatibility guidelines are found in most provisions
related to judicial independence.20 Indeed, the provision should be interpreted
2.2

basicdoc/partF-chapo1.htm; see also Chapter 2 by Meg Kinnear and Chapter 7 by Makane
is
i6

Mbengue in this volume.
lCJ Statute Art. 23.
lCJ Statute Art. ig. See generally Gleider I. Hernandez, Impartiality and Bias at the
International Court ofjustice, 3 Cambridge]. Int'! & Com.1.183 (2012).

i7
i8
ig

20

ICJ Statute Art.17.
Id.
See JD Morely, Relative Incompatibility of Function in the International Court, 19
Int'! & Comp. L.Q. 316 (1970 ); Philippe Couvrer, Article 17, in The Statute of the
International Court of Justice, A Commentary (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2nd
ed., 2012); see also Shabti Rosenne, International Court of justice: Practice Directions
on judges Ad Hoc; Agents, Counsel and Advocates; and Submission of New Documents,

i L. & Prac. Int'! Cts. & Tribunals 223 (2002).
See, e.g., Chapter 7 by Makene Mbengue in this volume (discussing challenges of judges in
International Criminal Courts).
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quite openly so as to include all situations that could create a reasonable doubt
of lack of impartiality and of pre-judgment of a certain case.21
The Court, however, has historically accepted situations that would be seen
as problematic in the present context of international litigation. 22 For example, Judge Helge Klaestad (Norway) continued to sit in the 1951 Norwegian
Fisheries case (Norway v. UK) even though he had been a member of the
Supreme Court of Norway that had given a decision invoked in the ICJ proceedings and relevant to them. 23 Similarly, Judges Jules Basdevant (France)
and Green Hackworth (us) sat in the 1952 Case Concerning the Rights of
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. us), though
they had been legal advisers to their respective ministers of foreign affairs at
the time the case was under diplomatic discussion. 24 This tollerant interpretation of relative incompatibility appear to more prevalent in the initial days of
the court, and followed closely the liberal practice adopted in this matter by
the Permanent Court oflnternationalJustice.2 5 Nowadays, ICJ judges are more
likely to adopt a stricter interpretation of the incompatibility provision, and
have in numerous occasions recused themselves in certain cases. 26 Indeed,
of the thirty-six known cases of self-recusals, twenty-one occurred after the
21

See, e.g., Chapter 8 by Romain Zamour in this volume (discussing prejudgment and openminded requirements).

22

Kolb, supra note 4, at 136; see Couvreur, Article 17, supra note 17, at 379-81 (providing an
overview of the practice of the PCIJ ).
Kolb, supra note 4, at 136; see Fisheries (u.K. v. Nor.),Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. u6, 134 (Dec.18)
(referencing a Supreme Court case in which the Court relied to interpret the Decree that
delimitated the exclusive fishery zone at issue in the ICJ case).
Kolb, supra note 4, at 136. Green Haywood Hackworth served as the first u.s. judge on
the International Court of Justice and was the longest running Legal Adviser to the us
Department of State, serving from 1925 to his elevation to the bench in 1946. See Rights of
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. u.s.),Judgment, 1952 1.c.J.
176 (Aug. 27).

23

/

24

25

See Kolb, supra note 4, at 136 (''.As regards Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Statute, the PCIJ'S
attitude was highly restrictive: normally it preferred to allow the judges in question
to sit.").

26

Couvreur, Article 17, supra note 17, at 382 ("Whenever a member of the Court, has, before
taking office, acted as agent, counsel or advocate of one of the parties to a case, has had
always disqualified himself from the case without this ever becoming an issue. The same
has applied to any judge taking part in arbitration proceeding which have become the
subject of proceedings before the Court."); see, e.g., Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide (Bosn.& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro),
Verbatim Record, 6 (Apr. 29, 1996, 10 a.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/5105
.pdf (showing the self-recusals of Judge Higgins and Judge Fleischhauer by informing the
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year 2000. 27 Thus, for example, Judge Rosalyn Higgins (uK) chose not to sit
in the Application of the Genocide Convention case because she had been a
member of the UN Committee of Human Rights and as such had previously
dealt with certain matters likely to be material in the case. 28 Similarly, Judge
Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria) recused himself from the bench in Arbitral
Award of 31 July 1989 case because he had been a member of the Arbitral tribunal in question. 29 Likewise, Judge Christopher Weeramantry (Sri Lanka)
decided not to sit in the Phosphate Lands in Nauru case because he had previously acted as the Chair of a Commission of Enquiry that reported on the matters and could be pertinent in the case.3°
This stricter approach to the relative incompatibility provision is preferable,
and is better suited to the role and work of the Court. Indeed, in light of the
increased workload of the Court, the important past professional experiences
of each judge and the delicate balance ensuing from the right for judges of the
nationality of the parties to sit in the case before the court, 31 the issue of relative incompatibility continues to be crucial. Moreover, while judges are barred
from acting as counsel, advocate, or as members of a national or international
court, they are routinely appointed as arbitrators in ad hoc investment and
other international arbitrations which increases the possibility of the existence of relative incompatibility. A more detailed account of self-recusals in
situations of relative incompatibility follows below, in section 3.3.
Absolute (Functional) Incompatibility to Serve as judge in the Court
Article i6 of the Statute provides that members of the Court "may not exercise
any political or administrative functions, or engage in any other occupation of
a professional nature."3 2 Given the membership of the bench, which includes
academics and high ranking international and national civil servants, this
2.3

President that they have dealt in their previous capacities with certain matters likely to
27
28
29
30
31
32

be material to that case).
See infra, table 1.

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Verbatim Record, supra note 25, at 6; see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
I.C.J. Yearbooki989-1990, at 157 (1990 ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
I.C.J. Yearbooki991-1992, at 198 (1992); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
ICJ Statute Art. 31(1).
ICJ Statute Art. 16. See generally G. Guillaume, De L'independence des Membres de la Cour
International de justice, in Boutros-Boutros-Ghali Arnicorum Discipulorumque Liber 475
(1998); L.V. Prott, The Role of the judge in the International Court ofjustice, 10 Revue Beige
de Droit International [RBDI] 473 (1974); G. Scwarzernberger, The Problem of Functional
Incompatibilities Before International Courts, 27 Y. B. World Aff. 434 (1973).
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functional incompatibility is at the core of the judicial function. Thus, once
elected, Members of the Court routinely resign from all previous professional
positions, including academic professorships and legal advisor or civil service
positions, including with the United Nations.33
Because of its importance to guarantee a fair and independent process, all
issues related to functional incompatibility and of the kind of activities that
are allowed and prohibited by the Statute have retained the attention of the
Court since its establishment, and have been analyzed by the Court in details.
The Court established a three-member committee on the incompatibility of
functions twice, in 1947 and 1967. The Committees' full reports are not published, though the ICJ Yearbooks confirmed similar guidelines to judges in four
broad categories of possible professional activities, and namely: other forms of
peaceful settlement of dispute (such as arbitration), scientific activities, public functions and occupation of a professional nature, and private activities.
Judges retain a degree of discretion and in the event of a doubt should consult the President of the Court for guidance on acceptable and unacceptable
activities. 34 A 1994 Report of the ICJ Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions delved deeper into functional incompatibility and
concluded that, under Article i6, judges are prohibited from exercising any
political or administrative function, irrespective to whether it is international,
national or local ad commercial or not. 35 Judges are also barred from holding
positions in any commercial concerns, engaging in the practice of law,

/

33

34
35

For example, Judge James Crawford was Whewell Professor of International Law at
Cambridge before joining the Court. Judge Bruno Simma was also Professor at the
European University Institute. Judges Ronny Abrahams and Joan Donahue were civil
servants, respectively with the French and us governments. Judge Abdulqawi Yusuf
servered for a long time with the United Nations. They all resigned from these posts
upon taking office. See Judge James Richard Crawford, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=200 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015);Judge Bruno Simma,
ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=14 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015);
President Ronny Abraham, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=136
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015); Judge Joan E. Donoghue, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/'?
p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=171 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015); Vice-President Abdulqawi Ahmed
Yusuf, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=168 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2015).
Philippe Couvreur, Article 16, in The Statute of the International Court of Justice,
A Commentary 365-366 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2012 ).
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 7, Add.11, U.N. Doc. A/49/7/Add.11 (Mar. 8, 1995); see also
Couvreur, Article 16, supra note 32, at 368.
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maintaining membership in a law firm or rendering legal or expert opinions or
holding any permanent teaching or administrative position.36
Interestingly, the 1994 Report also highlighted accepted practice, including
the fact that judges could continue to "participate in other judicial or quasijudicial activities of an occasional nature as well as scholarly pursuits in the
sphere of international law as members oflearned societies or as occasional lectures, provided that they give the fullest precedent to the duties of the court."37
The Court explicitly and definitively took up the question in its annual report
to the General Assembly, where it confirmed that "the practice of the Court in
permitting its members to engage in occasional activities outside of the Court
that may be remunerated" included "acting as arbitrators in inter-State and
private international arbitrations, serving in administrative tribunals or quasijudicial organs of specialized agencies, lecturing, [and] writing." 38 The Court
observed that this kind of occasional practice went back to "the origins of the
Permanent Court of Internationaljustice" and observed that not only it was
in conformity with the Statute of the Court; the repeated endorsement
by the international organs and by the States that appointed members of
the Court as arbitrators shows their awareness of the contribution that
the members of the Court may, by this function, make to the development of international law, and of the benefits deriving therefrom for all
institutions concerned.39
The Court remarked that the practices involved a very limited number of judges
for a very limited amount of time and that no adverse effect of the work of the
court. In practice, several judges have served as arbitrators in ad hoc arbitrations, including in the Eritrea/Yemen-Question of Territorial Sovereignty and
Maritime Delimitation over a Group of Islands in the Red Sea (Awards of 1998

36

Couvreur, Article 16, supra note 32, at 367.

37
38

Id.
Annual Report to the General Assembly for the Period 1August1995 to 31July 1996, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 199, u.N. Doc. A/50/7/Add.u (Dec. 12, 1995); see also
Couvreur, Article. 16, supra note 32, at 368.
Annual Report to the General Assembly, supra note 39; see also Couvreur, Article 16, supra
note 32, at 368.

39
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and December i7, iggg), 40 the Abyei Arbitration,41 and the Croatia/Slovenia
boundary disputes. 42 Moreover, a growing number of judges also act as arbitrators in international investment proceedings. 43
Additionally, the President of the Court is also occasionally asked to serve as
the appointing authority in ad hoc arbitrations. 44 Similarly, occasional invitations to deliver a speech or a class in a course or to address the public on the

40

41

42

43

44

Former Judges Stephen Schwebel and Rosalyn Higgins were members of the arbitral tribunal in both phases of the Eritrea/Yemen dispute. See Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the
First Stage ofthe Proceedings (Erti./Yemen ), Territorial Sovereignty and Scope ofthe Dispute
(Oct. 9, 1998), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=458; AwarJ of the Arbitral
Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings (ErtL/Yemen), Maritime Delimitation
(Dec. 17, 1999), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=459.
Former Judges Shawkat Al-Khasawneh and Stephen Schwebel were members of the
arbitration tribunal. See The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration), Final Award (July 22, 2009), http://www.pca-cpa
.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1240.
Former Judges Gilbert Guillaume and Bruno Simma are members of the arbitral tribunal for the currently pending Croatia/Slovenia arbitration. See Arbitration Between the
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, Pending Case, http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1443 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
For example, current member, Judge Peter Tomka is a member of an investor-state
arbitration tribunal related to a bilateral agreement between Germany and the Czech
Republic. See Antaris Solar GmbH (Germany) & Dr. Michael Gode (Gennany) v. The Czech
Republic, Pending Case, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1548 (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). Former member, Judge Bernardo Sepwveda-Amor, is the presiding
arbitrator in three investor-state proceedings related to bilateral agreements between
the governments of Cypress and Russia and the government of India. See (1) Tenoch
Holdings Limited (Cyprus) (2) Mr. Maxim Naumchenko (Russian Federation) (3) Mr. Andrey
Poluektov (Russian Federation) v. The Republic of India, Pending Cases, http://www
.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1552 (last visited Apr.19, 2015). Former Judge Stephen
Schwebel was a member of three investor-state arbitral tribunals between private companies and the Russia. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, Final
Award (July 18, 2014), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2722; Yukos Universal
Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, Final Award (July 18, 2014), http://www.
pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2723; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian
Federation, Final Award (Julyi8, 2014), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2724.
See, e.g., cc/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Te/com
Devas Mauritius Limited v. Republic of India, Decision on the Respondent's Challenge
to the Hon. Marc Lalonde as Presiding Arbitrator and Prof. Francisco Orrego Vicuna as
Co-Arbitrator, 1 (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw316i.pdf.pdf ("By the Appointing Authority: H.E. Judge Peter Tomka[,]
President, International Court of]ustice(. ]").
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activities of the Court are routinely accepted by judges and do not create any
incompatibility.45
24
Ad Hoc Judges
In addition to the elected Members of the Court, the Statute provides that if
the Court does not include in the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the
parties, the other party may chose a person to sit as ajudge. 46

The presence of national and ad hoc judges originated in the PCIJ Statute
and is not uncommon in international judicial proceedings by standing
courts. 47 That said, ad hoc judges in international litigation are somehow an
anomaly, as all judges are deemed to be independent and impartial and should
by themselves be able to provide comfort to all parties that their case will be
decided fairly. Further, elected judges are also elected partially because of
their nationality, but are then required to forgo that link once elected. Once
the Bench is constituted, it is peculiar that nationality should play a role again
when specific cases enter the docket.
Judges ad hoc are required to make the solemn declaration required from
elected members under Article 20. They take part in the decision on terms of
complete equality with their colleagues. 48
Several of the provisions applicable to elected members are also applicable
to ad hoc judges. In particular, all conditions of independence, of high moral
45
46

47

48

Kolb, supra note 4, at 133-34; Couvrer, Article. 16, supra note 32, at 366.
Statute Art. 31 ("1.Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right
to sit in the case before the Court. 2. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the
nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge. Such
person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been nominated
as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5. 3. If the Court includes upon the Bench
no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a
judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article .... 5. Should there be several parties in the
same interest, they shall, for the purpose of the preceding provisions, be reckoned as one
party only. Any doubt upon this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court... .").
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Art. 26, concluded Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.s. 221 ("(1)To consider cases brought before it, the
Court shall sit in a single-judge formation, in committees of three judges, in Chambers of
seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges. The Court's Chambers shall
set up committees for a fixed period of time .... (4) There shall sit as an exofficio member of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber the judge elected in respect of the High
Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or if that judge is unable to sit, a person
chosen by the President of the Court from a list submitted in advance by that Party shall
sit in the capacity of judge.").
See I CJ Statute Arts. 20, 31( 6).
!CJ
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character and of being either a jurisconsults of recognized competence in
international law or possessing the qualification required in their respective
countries for appointments to the highest judicial offices must also be fulfilled by ad hoc judges.49 Additionally, Article i7(2), prohibiting members to
participate in any case in which they have previously participated as agent,
counsel or advocate for one the parties or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity is also
applicable.so
To reconcile the freedom of the parties to select ad hoc judges of their
choosing with the requirement that all judges act independently, the Court
addressed possible instances of functional incompatibility of judge in its two
recent practice directions.SI Specifically, Practice Direction VII provides that:
The Court considers that it is not in the interest of the sound administration of justice that a person sit as judge ad hoc in one case who is
also acting or has recently acted as agent, counsel or advocate in another
case before the Court. Accordingly, parties, when choosing a judge ad
hoc pursuant to Article 31 of the Statute and Article 35 of the Rules of
Court, should refrain from nominating persons who are acting as agent,
counsel or advocate in another case before the Court or have acted in
that capacity in the three years preceding the date of the nomination.
Furthermore, parties should likewise refrain from designating as agent,
counsel or advocate in a case before the Court a person who sits as judge
ad hoc in another case before the Court.s2
Additionally, Practice Direction VIII provides that:
The Court considers that it is not in the interest of the sound administration of justice that a person who until recently was a Member of the
Court, judge ad hoc, Registrar, Deputy Registrar or higher official of the

49

ICJ Rules Art.1; ICJ Statute Art. 2.

50

ICJ Statute Art. 31(6) ('Judges chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this Article
shall fulfill the conditions required by Articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20, and 24 of the present Statute. They shall take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their
colleagues.").

51

Loretta Malintoppi, Independence, Impartiality, and Duty of Discloser of Arbitrators, in
International Investment Law 796, 813-14 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph
Schreuer eds., 2008).
Practice Direction VII, supra note 3.

52
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Court (principal legal secretary, first secretary or secretary), appear as
agent, counsel or advocate in a case before the Court. Accordingly, parties should refrain from designating as agent, counsel or advocate in a
case before the Court a person who in the three years preceding the date
of the designation was a Member of the Court, judge ad hoc, Registrar,
Deputy Registrar or higher official of the Court. 53
These directions are applicable for any choice or designation taking place after
February 7, 2002, and they are meant to exclude any possible instance of functional incompatibility arising from prior or current service at the ICJ.54

3

Mechanisms of Control: Resignation, Self-Recusal and
Disqualification ofJudges

In an effort to maintain the independence and impartiality of its judges and
the stature proper of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its
role as the primus inter pares of the standing courts, the ICJ Statute adopts a
tiered procedure to challenges and recusals of judges of the court.
Thus, as explained in details below, it is at first incumbent upon each judge
to recuse him or herself if some reason exists to do so. When this does not happen and the reasons that preclude them to serve continue to exist, it is the role
of the President of the Court, possibly informed by one of the parties, and of
the entire Court to ensure that no functional or relative incompatibility exists
in the course of proceedings.
Resignation from the Bench
Once elected, the judges of the ICJ are irremovable and serve for renewable
terms of nine years.55 As detailed in the next section, only a unanimous vote
of the other members of the Court can relieve a judge of his or her function in
situation where he or she has ceased to fulfill the required conditions to serve.
It is relatively more common for judges to resign from the Bench before the
end of their terms if a reason exists that precludes them to exercise their functions. Article 13 of the 1CJ Statute does not require that judges provide reasons
3.1

53
54
55

Practice Direction VIII, supra note 3.
For the limits of the practice directions see Chapter 13 by Hansel Pham and M. Imad Khan
in this volume.
!CJ Statute Art.13.
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for their resignations, which are to be addressed to the President of the Court
for transmission to the Secretary-General.
In general, however, such resignations occur either for serious health issues
or because of the existence of a new superseding long-term incompatibility. Thus, for example, Judge Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh resigned from the
Bench on December 31 2011 after being appointed Prime Minister of Jordan. 56
Similarly, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui resigned on September 30 1 2001, when he
was appointed President of the Constitutional Council of Algeria. 57 Vacancies
created by resignation are filled in the same method used to fill in the first
election. 58 Health related resignations are rarer, and judges may either wish
to serve for the entire remainder of their term and then simply not seek reelection, or may just prefer not to disclose the reasons for their resignation.
The newly elected judge serves for the remaining of the term of the judge he
or she replaces.59
It has also become customary for judges of certain veto-holding powers that
always have a judge of their nationality of the Bench to resign before the end
of their terms, possibly to allow an easier election for their successors, who will
run in a special election, and will then also have the time to prove themselves
as judges before running in general elections.60
1

56

1

See Press Release No. 2012/1, Int'! Court of Justice, The Secmity Council Has Fixed the
Date for the Election of a Successor to Mr. Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh, Former judge
and Vice-President of the International Court of Justice (Jan. 20, 2012 ), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/1/16861.pdf.

57

See Press Release No. 2001/20, Int'! Court of Justice, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, Former
President of the Court, Will resign as a Member of the Court as of 30 September 2001 (July
6, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=115&pt=1&p1=6&p2
=1&PHPSESSID=5c407. Kolb points out that other Judges that resigned from the Court
or its predecessor the PCIJ include: Moore (1928), Hughes (1930), Kellog (1935), Wang

58

(1936), Urrutia (1942), Nagaoka (1942), Golunski (1953), Morozov (1985), Jennings (1995),
(Schwebel) and Guillaume (2005). Kolb, supra note 4, at 133·
!CJ Statute Art.14.

59

!CJ

60

See for example the resignations of the two most recent us judges: Stephen Schwebel, who
was elected in 1981 and resigned in 2000, and Thomas Buergenthal, who was elected in
March 2000 and resigned in September 2010. See judge Buergenthal Resigns; u.s. National
Group NominatesJoan Donoghuefor Election to International Court ofjustice, 104 Am.J. Int'!
L. 489 (2010); Peter Kooijmans, Tivo Remarkable Men Have Left the International Court
ofjustice, Leiden J. Int'! L. 343 (2000) (discussing the resignation of President Stephen
Schwebel and Judge Christopher G. Weeramantry in 2000 ).

Statute Art.15.
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Removal ofjudges from the Bench by the Court
Article 18 of the Statute provides that judges can be removed by a unanimous
vote of the other members of the Court in situation where he or she has ceased
to fulfill the required conditions to serve. 61
In such eventuality, Article 6 of the Rules of the Court provides that the
President, or, if the circumstances so require, the Vice-President, informs
the relevant member of the Court with a written statement that includes the
grounds for the proposed removal and any relevant evidence. 62 At a private
meeting of the Court specially convened for the purpose, the member of the
Court is then afforded an opportunity of making a statement, of furnishing
any information or explanations he wishes, and of supplying answers, orally or
in writing, to any questions put to him. The matter will then be discussed in a
private meeting, without the presence of the member of the Court concerned,
at which each member of the Court shall state his or her opinion. A vote is
taken if requested. 63
Formal notification of the decision of removal that creates the vacancy is to
be made to the UN Secretary General by the ICJ Registrar. 64
The threshold for this procedure is high and would require some serious
failings, in terms of either work-related or personal conflict or serious health
issues that incapacitate the judge to exercise her functions. 65 Indeed, as it is
to be expected, in the history of the Court, there is "no recorded instances of
Article 18 being applied in order to dismiss a judge" or even of the question of
formal dismissal of a judge ever been formally entertained by the Court. 66
3.2

3.3
Voluntary (or Self) Recusals for a Specific Case
Voluntary (or self) recusals are by far the most common method to control the
composition of the ICJ bench and ensure its independence and impartiality.

61

62
63
64
65
66

ICJ Statute Art. 18 ("No member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous
opinion of the other members, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions. 2. Formal
notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General by the Registrar. 3. This notifi-

cation makes the place vacant.").
ICJ Rules Art.6.
Id.
ICJ

Statute Art.18.

See Kolb, supra note 4, at 132 n. 76.
David Anderson & Samuel Wordsworth, Article 18, in The Statute of the International

Court of Justice, A Commentary 392 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2006); see
also Kolb, supra note 4, at 132-33.
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Article 24 ( 1) provides that if a member of the Court considers that "for some
special reasons" he should not take part in the decision of a particular case, he
should inform the President. The language of the provision is very general so
as to allow its application in a variety of circumstances and to ensure that any
possible appearance of bias is voluntary addressed by the judge.
This form of relative incompatibility relates to the impartiality of a judge
for a particular case, and relates to the advisability for a judge to be part of
the bench for a particular case only, which does no result in the necessity
for the judge to resign and permanently leave the ICJ. In the history of the
Court, a number of judges have recused themselves for a variety of reasons.
For example, a judge who was involved as a legal adviser to a government
which is now party to a case could be reasonably seen as biased, despite the
judge's best effort. Similarly, there may be personal relationship at issue that
could create the appearance of a bias. Thus, Judge Benegal Rau recused himself in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case because he was the Indian representative in the Security Council when the dispute was discussed. 67 Similarly, Judge
Hersch Lauterpacht recused himself in the Nottebohm case noting that he had
been consulted by one of the parties before joining the Court.6 8 In another
case, Judge Jules Basdevant recused himself in the advisory opinion on the
judgments of the UNAT because the President of the Tribunal whose judgments
were to be reviewed by the Court was her daughter, Suzanne Bastid. 69
Table 1.1 summarizes the instances of self-recusals at the ICJ and the reasons
asserted by the judges in those situations.

TABLE LI

Summary ofjudges' self-recusal at the IC] and reasons assertecfl 0

Judge

Case

Reason

Sir Benegal Rau

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United

Having regard to the fact the
he had represented India in
the Security Council in

Kingdom v. Iran) Uu!:y 22,

1952)

67

I.C.J. Yearbook 1951-1952, at 89-90 (1952); see also Rosanne,

68

I.C.J. Yearbooki954-55, at 88 (1955); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064. Note also that

supra note 4, at 1063.

his son, Elihu Lauterpacht acted as counsel to Liechtenstein in the preliminary objection
phase.
69

Effect ofAwards ofCompensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Oral
Statements, 281 (June 10, 1954, 10:30 a.m. ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1063.

70

Note that this table also include cases in which no reason was given for a judge's absence
in the decision.
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Judge

Judge Basdevant
Judge Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht
Judge Jessup

Judge Zafrulla Khan

Case

UNAT advisor opinion

(July 13, 1954)
Second phase ofNotterbohm
case (Liechtenstein v.
Guatemala) (Apr. 6, 1955)
Either phase of Temple of
Preah Vihear case (Cambodia
v. Thailand) (May 26, 1961 &
June 15, 1962)
Barcelona Traction (Belgium v.
Spain) (July 24, 1964 & Feb. 5,

Reason
1951 whenithaddealtwith
the UK complaint against
Iran for failure to comply
with the interim measures
indicated by the Court
He was closely related to the
President of the Tribunal
Having previously advised
one of the parties and felt
that Article 1 7 applied
No reason given in
Judgement. 71

No reason given in
Judgement. 72

1970)

Juges Petren and
Ignacio-Pinto

Review of UNATjudgment
No. 158 Advisory Opinion
(July 12, 1973)

Informed President
(Zufmlla Khan) that having
contributed as members of
the Administrative Tribunal
to the establishment of
the jurisprudence of the
Tribunal referred to in the
case, they considered that
they should not take part
in the proceedings. The
action was taken under
Article 24 of the Statute and
the President agreed with
them. 73

71
72

73

Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
Id.
Application for Review ofjudgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Reading of the Advisory Opinion, 179 (July 12, 1973), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/57/g435.pdf; Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
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TABLE 1.1

Summary ofjudges' self-recusal (cont.)

Judge

Case

Reason

Sir RobertJennings
andJudge Evensen

Applicationfor Revision and
Interpretation of the Judgment
of 24 February 1982 in the Case
concerning the Continental
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) (Dec. 10, 1985)
ArbitralAward of31 July 1989
(Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal)
(Nov. 121 1991)
Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v. Australia) (June 26,

They gave prior notice to
the President (Nagendra
Singh) that they would not
take part in the case. 74

Judge Bedjaoui

Judge Weeramantry

1992)

Judge Fleischhauer
Judge Higgins

74
75
76
77

Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro) (July 11, 1996)

Since he had been a
member of the Arbitral
Tribunal in question. 75
Having previously been
Chairman of a commission
of Enquiry which had
reported on matters which
might be pertinent in the
case. 76
Judge Fleischhauer and
Judge Higgins informed
the President that having
previously dealt in their
previous capacities with
certain matters likely to be
material to the case, they
felt that they could not take
part in the case, pursuant to
the applicable provisions of
the Statute.77

I.C.J. Yearbooki984-1985, at 177 (1990 ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
I.C.J. Yearbook 1989-1990, at 157 (1990 ); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
I.C.J. Yearbook 1991-1992, at 198 (1992); see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1064.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn.& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Verbatim Record, 6 (Apr. 29, 1996),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/5105.pdf; see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1065
n.22.
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Judge

Case

Reason

Judge Tomka

Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia) (Sept. 25,

Judge Simma

All ofLegality of Use ofForce
(Preliminary Objections) cases
(June 2, 1999)
Certain Property (Liechtenstein
v. Germany) (Feb. 10, 2005)

''.Judge Tomka ... recused
himself under Article 24 of
the Statute of the Court." 78
Considered that pursuant to
Article 24( 1) he should not
take part in the cases. 79
Considered that pursuant to
Article 17(2) he should not
take part in the cases
''.Judge Abraham having
recused ... under Article
24 of the Statute of the

1997)

JudgeSimma

Judge Abraham

Certain Criminal Proceedings
in France (Republic of the
Congo v. France) (June 1 7,
2003)

Judge Abraham

Certain Questions ofMutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters
(Djiboutiv. France) (June 4,

Court."80
''.Judge Abraham ... recused
himself under Article 24 of
the Statute of the Court, 81

2008)

JudgeOwada

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay In 2006 the judges did not
(Argentina v. Uruguay) (Apr.
participate in the hearing
1

20, 2010)

"concerning Argentina's
request for provisional
measures for serious reasons
they informed the Court
of[]". Consequently the
Judges did not participate in
the finaljudgement. 82
"President Owada, who
sat on previous phases of
the case, informed VicePresident Tomka that, for
compelling reasons, he was

78
79
80
81
82

Report of the International Court of Justice, i August 2006-31July 2007, at 6 (2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/en/reports/report_2006-2007.pdf.
Rosanne, supra note 4 at 1064.
Id. at7.
Id.
I.C.J. Yearbook 2005-2006 1 at 278 (2006).
1
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TAB LE 1.1

Summary ofjudges' seif-recusal (cont.)

Judge

Judge ParraAranguren;
Judge Buergenthal

Judge Jiuyong; Judge
Parra-Aranguren;
JudgeSimma

83

Case

Reason

unable to attend the oral
proceedings on the merits
held between 14 September
and 2 October 2009. He did
not participate further in
the case."83
Note that Judges Shi and not
Buergenthal did not sit in
case for health reasons.
Application of the Convention Judge Parra-Aranguren
on the Prevention and
"attended the hearings in
Punishment of the Crime
the case and participated in
of Genocide (Bosnia and
some of the deliberations,
Herzegovina v. Serbia and
but not the final stages,
informed the President of
Montenegro) (Feb. 26~ 2007)
the Court that, pursuant
to Article 24, paragraph
1, of the Statute, he
considered he should not
take part in the decision
of the case.''84 Moreover,
Judge Buergenthal, under
Article 24( 1) of the Statute,
"informed the President the
he considered he should not
take part in the case.85
Requestfor Interpretation of the "Two Members of the Court
Judgment of31 March 2004
informed the President that
in the Case concerning Avena
they considered that they
and Other Mexican Nationals
should not take part in the
(Mexico v. United States of
case concerning Request

I.C.J. Yearbook 2009-2010, at 309 (2010 ).

84

I.C.J. Yearbook 2006-2007, at 277 (2007).

85

I.C.J. Yearbook 2005-2006, at 278 (2006); I.C.J. Yearbook 2006-2007, at 277 (2007).
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Judge

Case

Reason

America) (Mexico v. United
States ofAmerica) (Jan. 19,

for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31March2004
in the Case concerning
Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United
States of America) (Mexico
v. United States of America).
For serious reasons duly
explained to the Court,
another Member of the
Court was unable to take
part in the hearings on the
request for the indication
of provisional measures
submitted by the Applicant
in the case. Consequently,

2009)

Judge Simma;Judge
Parra-Aranguren

he did not take part in
the drafting of the Court's
decision on that request."86
"One Member of the Court,
Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) for reasons duly explained
to the President, was
(Feb. 3, 2009)
unable to sit in the case....
One other Member of the
Court recused himself from
participating in the case,
referring to Article 17,
paragraph 21 of the
Statute.''86

Judge
Parra-Aranguren

Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination
ofAll Forms ofRacial
Discrimination (Georgia v.
Russian Federation)

86

I.C.J. Yearbook 2007-2008 1 at 328-2 (2008).

87

J.C.J. Yearbook 2008-2009 1 at 348 (2009).

Under Article 23(3) and
Article 24( 1) of the Statute,
"[ o ]ne Member of the
Court, for reasons duly
explained to the President
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TABLE 1.1

Summary ofjudges' se!frecusal (cont.)

Judge

Judge Simma;Judge
Tomka

Judges Shi;
Judge Buergenthal;
Judge Koroma

Case

Reason

(Provisional Measures)
(Oct. 15, 2008)
Dispute regarding Navigational
and Related Rights (Costa Rica
v. Nicaragua) (July 13, 2009)

of the Court, was unable to
sit in the case."88
"One Member of the Court,
for reasons explained under
Article 24, paragraph 1,
of the Statute, informed
the President that he
would not sit in the case
concerning the Dispute
regarding Navigational and
Related Rights (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua)."89

Ahmadou Sadia Diallo
(Republic of Guinea v.
Democratic Republic of the
Congo) (Nov. 30, 20 1 o)

On Monday 19 April 2010,
at the start of the morning
hearing on preliminary
objections in the case,
President Owada noted
that, for reasons duly
communicated to him,
Judges Shi and Buergenthal,
who had both sat in
previous phases of the case,
were unable to sit in that
phase of the proceedings.
They did not participate
further in the case.90
Additionally, ''.Judge Koroma
had informed President
Owada that he was recusing
himself from the case.Judge
Koroma did not participate
further in the case."91

88

Id. at 348.

89

Id. at 348-49.

go
91

I.C.J. Yearbook 2009-2010, at 309 (2010).
Id. at 309.
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Judge

Case

Reason

Judge Higgins

Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/
Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks
and South Ledge (Malaysia/
Singapore) (May 23, 2008)

Prior to her election as
President of the Court,
Dame Higgins, referring to
Article 17, paragraph 2, of
the Statute, recused herself
from participating in the

Judge Hanqin

Judge Greenwood
JudgeSimma

case. 92
Accordance with international Judge Hanqin was council
law of the unilateral declaration for the Republic of China in
the case. 93
ofindependence in respect of

Kosovo (Request for Advisory
Opinion) (July 22, 20 10)
Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile)
(Jan. 27, 2014)
judgment No. 2867ofthe
Administrative Tribunal of
the International Labour
Organization upon a Complaint
Filed against the International
Fund for Agricultural
Development (Request for
Advisory Opinion) (Feb. 1, 20 12)

No reason given in
judgement.
No reason given in
judgement.

As Shabtai Rosenne notes, the prov1s1ons of the Statute regarding selfrecusation "are normally applied as a matters of routine" 94 and in fact selfrecusals are quite common.
As a matter of legal policy, this provision makes sense. Judges are elected
amongst persons qualified to serve in their country's highest judicial offices
and from among persons of high moral character. It is justified to have them
decide, in the first instance, whether a conflict exists that should prevent them
for sitting in a specific case. Moreover, with fifteen sittingjudges, and a required
quorum of nine judges, the ICJ's Bench is sufficiently large to accommodate

92
93
94

I.C.J. Yearbook 2010-2011, at 234 n. 5 (2011).

Id at411.
Rosenne, supra note 4, 1062.
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the potential of one or two judges being unable to sit without impacting the
final outcome of a thoughtfully decidedjudgment. 95
Importantly, while it is primarily a decision of each judge whether to seek to
recuse him or herself, further control mechanisms exist to ensure an independent bench should a judge be recalcitrant to opt for self-recusal.
The Role of the Court's President
The President of the Court plays a fundamental role in ensuring that the
independence of the Court is maintained. Thus, Article 24 provides that "if
the President considers that for some special reasons one of the Members of
the Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him [or her] notice
accordingly." 96
This power has been used rarely; indeed only one instance is known. In the
South West Africa case (Ethiopia & Liberia v. South Africa), the President, Sir
Percy Spender, announced in the opening of the substantive hearings that Sir
Mohammed Zafrullah Khan would not participate in the case. Though there is
no public record, it appeared from subsequent declarations by Judge Khan that
the President himself had asked Judge Khan not to participate in the case, as
he had at one point been nominated as an ad hoc judge by one of the parties,
though he had not acted in that capacity. 97
Article 34 of the Rules of the Court further provides that in case of any doubt
arising as to the application of Article i7(2) of the Statute or in case of a disagreement as to the application of Article 24 of the Statute, the President shall
inform the Members of the Court, who retain the final power of decision. 98

34

/

The Role of the Court
The ultimate arbiter for all issues related to the composition of the Court
remains the Court itself. Under Article 24 for example, it is for the Court to
settle by decision on any disagreement between a member of the Court and
the President on whether a special reason exists as a consequence of which a
member should not sit in particular case.99

3.5

1

95

!CJ Statute, Art. 25.3 ("A quorum of nine judges shall suffice to constitute the Court").

96

!CJ Statute Art. 24.

97

Sir Robert Jennings & Philippe Couvreur, Article 24, in The Statute of the International
Court of Justice, A Commentary 461-62 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2006);

see also Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1058.
98
99

ICJ Rules Art. 34.
ICJ Statute Art. 24.
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The Court is also involved in all final decisions related to relative or functional incompatibility of a judge to hold office. Thus, under Article 16(2) of the
Statute, the Court decides on any doubt related to the exercise of political or
administrative functions or engagement in other professional occupation by
the any of its Members. 100 Similarly, the Court is also the ultimate decision
maker on any doubt related to a Member's acting as agent, counsel or advocate
or past activities as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a
member of a national or international court; or of a commission of enquiry, or
in any other capacity.IOI Article 34(1) of the Rules also provides that it is for the
Court as a whole to decide any doubt about the application of Article 17(2) of
the Statute.102
3.6
Third Party Disqualification Requests
Disqualification proceedings can also be initiated by one of the parties. Under
Article 34(2) of the Rules, a party can communicate confidentially to the
President in writing "any facts which it considers to be of possible relevance"
to the application of Article 17 and Article 24 of the Statute, and which the parties believe may not be knowri to the Court.I03

4

Grounds for Disqualification

Grounds for disqualifications of judges at the ICJ are not specified separately
in the Statute. Rosenne points out that there "seem to be no standing grounds
04
for recusation beyond the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Statute.... "I
These grounds, analyzed in details above, provide certain limited cases of relative and absolute (or functional) incompatibility.105
100
101

Id. Art.16(2).
Id. Art. 17.

102

ICJ Rules Art. 34.
Article 34 of the Rules provides that "i. In case of any doubt arising as to the application
of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Statute or in case of a disagreement as to the application
of Article 24 of the Statute, the President shall inform the Members of the Court, with
whom the decision lies. a. If a party desires to bring to the attention of the Court facts
which it considers to be of possible relevance to the application of the provisions of the
Statute mentioned in the previous paragraph, but which it believes may not be known
to the Court, that party shall communicate confidentially such facts to the President in
writing." Id.
Rosenne, supra note 4, at 1062.
See supra Section 2.2 and Section 2.3.
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104
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Thus, under these provisions, there are three grounds for recusal that derive
from the ICJ Statute:

judge exercising political or administrative function. The restriction is
derived from Article 16.
(2) Acting as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case. The prohibition is derived
from Article 17(1) and applies only to elected members.
(3) Past participation in a case as agent, counsel, or advocatefor one ofthe parties, or as a member ofa national or international court, or ofa commission
of enquiry, or in arry other capacity. This provision derives from Article
17(2), which applies to both elected and, by operation of Article 31(6), ad
hoc judges.

(1)

4.1

/

Instances ofAttempted Disqualification ofjudges

A party's attempts to disqualify judges of the ICJ are rare. Since its inception,
the Court only dealt with three formal attempts to have the Court find members of the Court ineligible in a particular case in three different cases. 106 All
three cases relate to alleged prejudgment of the case and relate to past diplomatic actions at the United Nations. In one case, one party also alleged that
certain declarations made by one of the judges allegedly demonstrated possible bias. All three challenges were unsuccessful. Only in one case the motivations for rejecting the challenge are public. Interestingly, two of the three cases
refer to instance of alleged bias in advisory opinions, which are not binding,
and only one was brought during contentious proceedings.
South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v. South Africa & Liberia v. South
Africa)
In the second phase of the South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia & Liberia v. South
Africa), South Africa notified the Court "of its intention to make an application to the Court relating to the composition of the Court relating to the composition of the Court."107 The Court rejected the application after hearing the
contentions in closed hearing. Both the members and the judge ad hoc took
part in that decision. 108 The details of the recusal application by South Africa
have never been revealed. However it was known to refer to Judge Luis Padilla
Nervo (Mexico), who had been President to the 1951 session of the General
4.1.1

107

Rosenne, supra note 4, at 1059.
South West Africa Cases (Ethi & Liber. v. S. Afr.), Order Relating to Composition of the

108

Court, 4 (Mar.18, 1965), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/47/2718.pd£
Id. at5.
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Assembly and had been a member of the Mexican delegation to the General
Assembly from 1947 to 1963.109 South Africa filed an application to the Court
Relating to the Composition of the Court on March 14, 1965. The Court notified the Agents for the Applicants and heard the contentions of the Parties
with regard to the application in closed hearings on March 15 and 16, 1965.110 It
rejected the challenge by eight votes to six by formal order made under Article
48 of the Statute. 111 Judge Padilla Nervo did not participate in the vote of the
order, but then participated in the Judgment. Interestingly, the judges ad hoc
also participated in that vote.112
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970)
In the related advisory opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [Namibia Advisory Opinion],
South Africa attempted to disqualify three members of the Court.113 The government of South Africa filed written statements on November 19, 1970 where
it objected to the participation of certain members of the Court in the proceedings. The Court issued three separate orders on January 26, 1971. The Orders
were made under Article 48 of the Statute and were unreasoned.
4.1.2

Order No. 1: In relation to President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan-the
court unanimously decided not to accede to the objection that had been
raised. The vote was taken by all twelve non-challenged Judges. President
Khan, Judge Padilla Nervo, Judge Morozov did not participate.114
Order No. 2: With regard to Judge Padilla Nervo. The Court unanimously decided not to accede to the objection that had been raised.
Judges Padilla Nervo and Morozov did not participate in the vote. 115

109
110
i11
112
113

Rosenne, supra note 4, at 1059.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

114

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [Namibia Advisory

115

Namibia Advisory Opinion, Order No. 2, 1971 I.C.J. 6 (Jan. 26).

Opinion], Order No.1, i971 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 26).
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Order No. 3: With regard to Judge Morozov. The Court by ten votes to
four decided not to accede to the objection that had been raised. Judge
Morozov did not participate in the vote.116

/

On the same date, the Court also issued Order No. 4 denying South Africa's
request to appoint aJudge adhoc. 117 In its advisory opinion the Court explained
that the objections were made under Article 17(2) of the Statute.118 In the opinion, the Court also explained that South Africa's objections were based "on
statements made or other participation by the Members concerned, in their
former capacity as representatives of their Governments, in United Nations
organs which were dealing with matters concerning South Africa." 119 The Court
gave careful consideration to South Africa's objection but found no reason, for
Order no. 2, to depart from the decision it had taken in its order of March 18,
1965 in the South West Africa cases.120 In deciding the other two cases, the
Court found that the Members' activities in the UN organs prior to their election to the Court did not "furnish grounds for treating these objections differently" from those raised in its 1965 decision.121 The Court also specified that,
as for Oder no. 3, the participation of the Member, prior to his election to
the Court, in the formulation of a Security Council resolution that took into
consideration in its preamble GA Res. 2145 (xx1) did not justify a different
conclusion.122 In explaining its decision on the challenges, the Court also specifically refers to the precedents established by the PCIJ "wherein judges sat in
certain cases even though they had taken part in the formulation of texts the
Court was asked to interpret."123
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory
The challenge brought against Judge Nabil Elaraby (Egypt) by Israel in the
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory [Wall Opinion] is the most recent case of a party
requesting the recusal of a judge because of his past professional experience.

4.1.3

119
120
121

Namibia Advisory Opinion, Order No. 3, 19711.c.J. 9 (Jan. 26).
Namibia Advisory Opinion, Order, 1971 I.C.J. 12, 13 (Jan. 29).
Namibia Advisory Opinion, Advisory Opinion, 1971I.C.J.16, if 9 (June 21).
Id.
Id.
Rosanne, supra note 4, at 1060.
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GA

123

Id.

116
117
118

Res. 2145(xx1) of 27October1966 (Question of South-West Africa).

THE CHALLENGE AND RECUSAL OF JUDGES

31

It is also the first time that a party also uses public declarations by a judge as a
ground for recusal.
In the Wall Opinion, Israel sent a confidential letter to the ICJ President to
bring to his attention certain facts it considered possibly relevant to the participation of judge Elaraby in the case.124 Israel raised three issues. First, it claimed
that judge Elaraby should be recused because of his active, official and public
role as an Egyptian diplomat. The Court rejected this claim and noted the experience of judge Elaraby in the 1970s and 1980s as a legal adviser to the Egyptian
Government, including his work at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and his involvement in the Camp David Middle East Peace Conference of 1978
and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979 "were performed in his capacity of a
diplomatic representative of his country" and occurred "many years before the
question of the construction of the wall in the occupied Palestinian territory,
now submitted for advisory opinion, arose:•125 Second, Israel also claimed that
judge Elaraby had been involved in decisions at the General Assembly that
were relevant for the case. The ICJ again dismissed the claim and concluded
the question for the Court "was not an issue in the Tenth Emergency Special
Session of the General Assembly until after judge Elaraby had ceased to participate in that Session as representative of Egypt.''126 Finally, Israel complained
that in an interview prior to his election to the Court, judge Elaraby had made
127
statements that could infer a prejudgment of some of the issues in the case.
The Court again dismissed the claim and concluded that judge Elaraby's

124
125

Legal Consequence of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

Order of the Composition of the Court [Wall Opinion], 2004 J.C.J. 3 (Jan. 30).
Id. if 8 ("Whereas however the activities of Judge Elaraby referred to in the letter of
is January 2004 from the Government of Israel were performed in his capacity of a diplomatic representative of his country, most of them many years before the question of the
construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, now submitted for advisory
opinion, arose; whereas that question was not an issue in the Tenth Emergency Special
Session of the General Assembly until after Judge Elaraby had ceased to participate in
that Session as representative of Egypt; whereas in the newspaper interview of August
2001,Judge Elaraby expressed no opinion on the question put in the present case; whereas
consequently Judge Elaraby could not be regarded as having 'previously taken part' in the

126
127

case in any capacity.").
Id.
Joseph R. Brubaker, The judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International
Adjudication, 26 Berkeley J. Int'! L. m, 119 (2008) (citing Wall Opinion, 2004 l.C.J. 3, if 8
(Jan. 30) (dissenting opinion ofJudge Buergenthal)) ("that 'Israel is occupying Palestinian
territory, and the occupation itself is against international law' and that Israel's territorial

claims were fabricated to create 'confusion and gain[] time'.").
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. . on t h e ques t"ion pu t m
. th e presen t case."128
comments "expressed no op1mon
The Court hence concluded that Judge Elaraby had not previously taken part
in the case, as required by Article 17(2) of the Statute for a finding of relative
incompatibility. Israel's request was rejected thirteen to one (as it is customary,
Judge Elaraby did not participate in the vote). Interestingly, Judge Buergenthal
dissented on the last point and asserted that although this "formalistic and
narrow" construction of Article 17(2) had not been violated, he was concerned
that the interview created "an appearance of bias" that required the Court to
preclude Judge Elaraby's participation in the proceedings. 129
In sum, this limited practice shows that the Court has found that prior diplomatic activities as government representatives or at the United Nations would
not generally be considered tantamount to a prior participation in the case
and would therefore not create a reason to disqualify a judge under the applicable rules. Judge Buergenthal's dissent raises the important point of whether
this application of the standard is too formalistic, and whether an "appearance of bias" standard, in line with other arbitral rules, is preferable. This is
an important discussion to be had, especially because, on one side, judges are
often selected among those who have significant experience as diplomats or
as international law counsel, and, on the other side, the growing use of international dispute resolution mechanisms can result in increased instances of
conflicts.

/

5

Conclusion

Requests for recusal and disqualification of judges of the 1CJ are rare and none
so far has been successful. The control mechanisms of the composition of
the ICJ's Bench rely mostly on the individual decision not to participate in a
case by each judge (self-recusal). This system has been largely successful, and
several judges have over the years decided not to participate in certain cases
because of their previous professional experiences. The President of the ICJ
has used his power to request a judge not to participate in a case only once.130
When a request for disqualification was filed by a party, the Court has adopted
a strict reading of the applicable rules, and generally refused to consider
that prior diplomatic functions at the UN or in one's Capital may create an
128
129
130

Wall Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 3, if 8.
Id. if 14.
Though it is difficult to know if some instances of self-recusals may have resulted from an
informal discussion with the President.
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incompatibility. With the increase use of binding dispute resolutions mechanisms, the higher scrutiny of judges' behavior, and the fact that many judges
acted as counsel, arbitrators or diplomats in a variety of cases or continue to
act as arbitrators in international disputes, the discussion over the standard to
apply to assess a party's recusal requests will be an important one.

